The North American automobile industry looks more and more like a crash scene-- each day seems to bring more bad news for auto workers and their communities. The debris is everywhere.
In the past few months
• GM announced that it will shut 12 plants and lay-off 30,000 workers over the next few years. Ford followed suit with a plan to close14 plants and lay-off 30,000 workers. Since 2000, 140,000 jobs have been lost in the old Big Three auto companies.
• Both GM and Ford asked for and got mid-contract concessions on benefits from the UAW. GM now plans to ask for even more concession to help bail out its North American operations.
• The parts industry continues to implode. Delphi—GM’s largest supplier and a company it spun off in 1999 in an earlier restructuring-- is now in Chapter 11 and has asked the courts to allow it to get rid of its union contracts covering 33,000 hourly workers. The company wants huge pay and benefit cuts. Many of Delphi 44 plants in North America are likely to close. Tower Automotive, another large parts producer, is also on Chapter 11 and has also petitioned to dump its contract covering thousands of workers. . The outlook for parts workers is grim: some experts say that one-third of the parts industry is headed for bankruptcy court. Expect the massive shift to off-shore production to intensify.
• Further “downstream”, car hauler Performance Transportation, which operates Leaseway and two other companies, has also filed for Chapter 11, citing reduced business as a reason. The fate of its 1,900 Teamster drivers is uncertain.
This crash has been a long time coming. The big US auto companies have been in a perpetual state of reorganization for decades as they struggled to come to grips with global competition. Each re-organization has been bad news for workers and each has failed to stabilize the companies or the industry.
The old integrated corporate structure has been replaced by much more decentralized “just-in-time” systems based on complex global supply chains. Some of companies in these supply chains—like Delphi--are spin-offs from the Big 3. On the shop floor work has been reorganized and intensified to increase productivity.
Meanwhile, Asian and European car companies built assembly plants in the US and gained a growing share of the US market. More are planned. They bring tons of money, build modern plants; institute state of the art production systems; hand-pick a more compliant workforce mostly in the non-union US South; and successfully use union avoidance schemes to stave off organizing drives. They have none of the “legacy’ costs of the Big 3 and provide much less generous benefits than those the UAW has negotiated over the years. To take one example: GM health care premiums add $1500 per car; non-union Toyota health care costs adds $300. The newcomers also build higher quality products that people want to buy. Today, “transplant” account for 40% of sales in the US market.
But let’s not forget that Ford and General Motors are also global companies that produce and sell cars around the world and quite profitably. Last year GM sold more cars outside the US than it did within the US. It’s now the leading producer of cars in the growing Chinese market, where its plants operate at capacity. Ford turned a profit on its far-flung overseas operations as well.
The continuous reorganizations of the last two decades are part of a powerful and highly successful campaign to roll back wages and benefits for auto workers throughout the world. Global companies operating in global markets are outflanking auto workers and their unions everywhere. Despite the relative power of auto worker unions in many countries, conventional national union strategies are proving inadequate for blocking the auto companies attack.
That’s why, in the US, even though by the conventional measures of union strength—high density, active organizing, and good collective bargaining agreements—auto workers should be well positioned to resist the corporate attacks, they have been unable to do so.
Consider the following:
High density 60% of all of the cars and trucks sold in North America are assembled by union workers.(2003 numbers) While this is down from the 82% level of the late 1970s, it’s still a union density that is unimaginable in most sectors.
In the parts industry, union density is much lower. As a former division of GM, Delphi’s North American operations are essentially unionized wall to wall. Contracts basically carried over from GM meant that Delphi workers have wages and benefits up to core industry standards. But Delphi and other union producers are competing against a growing number of companies producing in Mexico and other low wage countries and with non-union plants in the US. In the late 1970s some 56% all parts workers in the US were unionized, today it’s more like 25%.
Organizing There is active organizing in the parts sector and it’s meeting with some success. The UAW has been able to use its leverage with big auto makers to help organize 17,000 workers at parts suppliers like Johnson Controls and Metaldyne in the last few years. Union density rates actually increased in the parts sector from a low of 23% to 25% in 2004. But workers have been unable to achieve wages and benefits at anything like those that have historically prevailed in the auto industry. The union has had little room to maneuver: in a highly competitive system since the alternative to pay cuts is often unemployment.
The UAW has made several unsuccessful runs at organizing the “transplant” assembly plants in the South. It’s still trying, but it’s likely to be tough going if workers perceive that the union can’t maintain wages and benefits or protect their jobs from going elsewhere.
Collective bargaining. The high union density in the auto industry gave the UAW the muscle to negotiate good collective bargaining agreements. But over the last two decades bargaining has been defensive--focused more on preserving rather than improving wages and benefits.
It’s difficult to say what more the union can do within the confines of the existing industrial relations system. Most of the key issues facing auto workers today can’t be adequately addressed through collective bargaining as it is currently practiced.
• Management incompetence and poor product selection are both legally and customarily outside the scope of traditional collective bargaining.
• A global glut of cars makes it difficult for companies to make adequate profit margins.
• Preserving a private welfare system puts union companies at a competitive disadvantage.
• Global competition puts downward pressure on wages, especially in the parts industry.
• Macro economic factors like the strength of the US dollar affect the cost of production in the US
The fact is, despite the best efforts of workers and their unions—despite high union density, aggressive organizing, and good collective bargaining agreements—auto workers are bumping up against the limits of conventional trade union strategies.
The situation is tough but not at all hopeless. Auto workers and their unions have been fighting corporate attacks on their wages, working conditions, and benefits for a long time. The lessons they have learned will serve them in the defensive battle that they must fight. But alongside that defensive fight new strategies must be created. A first step is building strong global alliances with other unions and allies to resist corporate attacks on wages and working conditions. These global alliances need to fight for new international agreements that reduce the ability of corporations to blackmail workers with threats of job mobility and disinvestment. And these alliances must be built into the fabric of the union at all levels. With the framework of such global alliances it will begin to be possible to develop a labor alternative for the big questions that face the international auto industry and its workers.
In coming blogs we will look at what’s now being done to build alliances, how workers around the world are confronting the assault on wages and working conditions, and at suggestions from a variety of perspectives on what more could be done.
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