Unless unions radically alter their conventional strategies, the future of trade unionism in the US is bleak. A narrow focus on collective bargaining as a way to expand and preserve wages, working conditions, and economic security is not enough in an age of aggressive global corporate capitalism. That is the sub-text of a chilling article that appeared in Sunday's New York Times (February 26, 2006)
The article reported on the end “of the high wage” era at Caterpillar plants in Illinois. Compensation (wages and benefits) for machinists has fallen by more than $20 an hour. Less skilled jobs that previously paid a base wage of $41,000 a year now pay about $26,000 after a concessionary agreement was signed by the company and the UAW 13 months ago.
In fact, the downward spiral at Caterpillar has been underway for a long time.
Here are the basics as reported by the New York Times.
After a decade of intense battles, that included official strikes, wildcats, slowdowns and whatever other leverage workers could muster, Caterpillar defeated its workers and the UAW and forced them to sign a long concessionary contract. The contract calls for a two tier pay scale that drastically reduces pay for new hires. The company says that it has “grandfathered” older workers pay rather than established a two-tier system, to reinforce the idea that this is a permanent change.
It’s a good term, ‘grandfathered’ because these folks were preserved at a wage-and-benefits level that was essentially twice the market,” Mr. Glynn [a company executive] said. Already 50% of the upper tier workers who were around in 2004 have left, through retirement or attrition.
Caterpillar says new pay scales are pegged slightly above the regional labor market so that it can attract the best workers, and still keep wages down. The result is a huge drop in compensation for some jobs. Rates were so low in some jobs that Caterpillar had to adjust them upwards after the contract was signed to retain and attract workers.
The current 6 year agreement calls for one across the board pay raise of 2% in 2008, although there are apparently bonuses available for some.
According to the Times:
New hires are encouraged to view assembly-line work as short term. The way up from the admittedly meager wage scale is not a better union contract, the message goes, but a promotion—if not within Caterpillar, that at another employer. Driving a forklift or working on an assembly line for 20 years should not be a career goal.
This approach fits nicely with Caterpillar’s personnel policies which, according to the Times are geared to shifting the loyalty of workers from the union to the company.
Caterpillar is not a corporation on its last legs looking for a way to survive by seeking concessions from its unions. But, like an increasing number of successful companies, Caterpillar is still demanding give-backs. As a result,
…the longstanding presumption that factory workers at successful companies can achieve a secure, relatively prosperous middle-class life for themselves and their families is evaporating.
Caterpillar is a powerful symbol of this process,’ said Harley Shaiken, a labor economist at the University of California at Berkeley. ‘It dominates its field. It is one of America’s largest exporters, and it is very profitable. If ever there was a company that could bring back the social contract of the mid-20th century, it is Caterpillar. But it chooses not to.
What Caterpillar has done is the very model of a modern corporation. Its North American operation serves as the hub of a ‘globally competitive’ production system that includes plants around the world that produce for global and regional markets. The company is currently planning to build a plant in China.
This southern network [a string of low wage plants recently opened in the US South], as well as plants in Mexico, feeds parts and components to the big Illinois factories, where most of Caterpillar’s tractors, earth movers, backhoes and excavators, giant off-highway trucks and other heavy equipment are assembled for sale in the US and, to some extent, for export…..
But the company itself… cannot succeed [according to a Caterpillar Executive] without the concessionary UAW contract, combined with the network of lower-wage ‘focus plants’ in the Sun Belt and in Mexico.
It’s a beautiful North American equation,’ Mr. Owen [a company executive] said.
The new concessionary contract has, in fact, increased employment in the Illinois plants. Work that might have gone to the low wage southern plants has stayed in the unionized Illinois plants now that wages have plummeted. UAW membership has increased as well. One Illinois local has increased its membership by 1,500 workers since 2004.
The union leadership in Illinois--at least as quoted in the Times--seems to be in of the
scale and of the problem it faces.
One Local leader says he tells new hires, “….that five years down the road, when the present contract expires, we in the union are going to improve their lot in life.”
“That does not seem likely,” the Times comments succinctly.
But there is much more to this story than what is in the New York Times article. It’s a long story of the failure of the US labor movement to adjust to corporate globalization.
Here’s a brief excerpt from what one of us wrote in the late 1990s.
Caterpillar began its attack unions in the late 1980s. Caterpillar workers conducted a 103-day factory occupation in Scotland in 1987 and a six day occupation in Canada in 1991.
In the United States, the company and the UAW had a cooperation program in the 1980s that was oriented toward creating more efficient production so that American plants would be more competitive. While that was happening, the company also pursued its own restructuring program, which reduced the workforce by 30 percent and built new, non-union plants. In 1991, the Caterpillar Company demanded a whole range of concessions, including a two-tier pay scale, changes in health insurance, and a familiar litany of similar takebacks. Caterpillar Chairman Donald V. Fites said he needed greater flexibility to set wages, benefits, and working conditions, to protect Caterpillar’s preeminent position in competition with companies in Japan and Europe.
Workers struck in November, 1991 and the bargaining chair of the largest local told the press, "As long as we hold the line, and don't take our experience in there, we're going to be all right." In other words, the withdrawal of labor power by this group of workers in itself would be sufficient to win the strike and protect them from what the company was trying to do.
After five months, Caterpillar threatened to bring in replacement workers. Caterpillar workers were afraid of permanently losing their jobs, and the UAW leadership ordered the workers back to work. The New York Times commented, "The abrupt end of a five-month strike against Caterpillar showed that management can bring even a union as mighty and rich as the United Automobile Workers to its knees.
Two and a half years later, the UAW ordered its members back on strike. The company attempted to continue production with strikebreakers, and to a considerable extent it was successful. After 17 months on strike, the UAW negotiated a new agreement with Caterpillar which the workers voted down by nearly 80 percent. Then the UAW "recessed" the strike and ordered union members back to work anyway.
Conditions on their return were horrendous. The NLRB has filed over 250 separate complaints for unfair labor practices against Caterpillar and found that the company's "pattern of unlawful conduct convinces us that, without proper restraint Caterpillar, is likely to persist in its attempts to interfere with employees' statutory rights." That prediction has proved correct.
Yes, the prediction was true in the 1990s and it continues to be true today.
There are a number of grim lessons in this story. First, Caterpillar workers and their union acting on their own were no match against the company in a head to head battle. Caterpillar could draw on resources from profit centers around the world to sustain itself even during a prolonged fight. This was especially true because Caterpillar can use divide and conquer strategies against a global workforce that never managed to unite in a common struggle.
Second, global corporations are constantly changing and re-organizing so that they are moving targets. If the union recovers its strength and its fight at Caterpillar in Illinois the company is likely to respond in new ways, or by moving its plants.
Third, simply adding new union members and increasing union density is not necessarily a sign of strength—in this case it’s actually a sign of weakness, since the new members were a result of a collapse in wages. The real test is: can a union deliver for its new members.
And, finally, and most importantly, conventional collective bargaining is becoming less and less viable as a stand alone union strategy. New approaches to representation are needed—approaches that combine social movement style strategy and tactics; a new labor politics that challenges the need to slash wages to generate new jobs; and the creation of a global movement that links workers employed by the same employers, in the same industry, and in the global economy as a whole.
Some in the labor movement think it is defeatist to talk about the failure of conventional unionism and collective bargaining to adequately represent workers' interests. But it is our experience that people want the truth—workers know that globalization undermines union strength, it is obvious for all to see, and they are unlikely to place their trust in those that do not seem to understand this.
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