Two recent
images of the labor movement in this time of crisis stand out for their stark
contrast.
One is a photograph
of UAW President Ron Gettlefinger sitting at the witness table before a
Congressional committee with the heads of the Big 3 auto makers, pleading for
help. The other is a photo of
jubilant workers celebrating their victory after a six day sit-in at the
Republic Windows and Doors factory in Chicago.
It is not
stretching things to say that these images crystallize the problems and
possibilities of organized labor today.
Missed
opportunities
Gettlefinger’s
testimony was a sad coda to an era in US industrial relations that actually
ended in September 2007 when the UAW reached a concession packed agreement with
GM following a two day strike, and similar agreements later that year
with the other auto makers. The agreements froze wages for production workers;
reclassified and placed “non-production” workers on a lower wage scale; and set
a new hire rate at about $14.00 an hour—about half what incumbent workers
earn—with inferior benefits. A buyout program was designed to push as many
senior workers out the door as possible to make room for the new hires. The
union promoted the contract as a way to buy time for the companies to
reorganize and retool.
Nothing
much happened. The restructuring took the form of plant closures. The retooling
remained a promise by the Big 3 to produce more energy efficient cars. But all
the while the companies kept up their incessant advertisements for SUVs,
pick-ups, and other gas guzzlers. And they continued to pursue their
lobbying and lawsuits against tougher mileage standards. The spike in gas
prices and the credit crunch provided the coup de grace to a dying industry.
In October
2007, we asked on this blog,
whether the UAW could turn its collective bargaining defeat into a strategic
retreat by regrouping and developing an independent survival plan for the
industry? Now we know the answer: they could not. Tragically, the UAW kept
marching in lock step with the very companies that were destroying the US
industry. The union even supported the companies’ opposition to tougher mileage
standards because, they argued, it would unfairly hurt sales of light trucks
and SUVs and imperil many jobs.
Had the union taken an independent course things might now be different. They might have been able to mobilize popular opinion behind a plan to produce greener cars and new vehicles for public transportation, preserving the jobs and the economies of the communities that depend on them. Instead, there is no plan to rally around, only a demoralized plea for a bailout.
Time
warp
It is not
just the UAW that seems out of touch with the moment. In the run-up to this
year’s election organized labor made a plan to pour its resources into electing
a Democratic President and Congress and then to push for the enactment of the
Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), which is designed to make organizing easier.
They did a terrific job during the election; in some key areas labor was the
difference between victory and defeat for the Democrats.
Then with
unexpected abruptness September’s financial collapse provided the accelerant
for a general economic crisis that had been smoldering for more than a year.
Since then, labor has been unable to adapt to the changed circumstances.
Right-wing politicians and corporate executives have called for government
bailouts and the partial nationalization of whole industries, abandoning decades
of market fundamentalism, but labor is sticking to the plan it hatched in what
now seems like another era. With the exception of a few public pronouncements
on the crisis, labor leaders have retained an almost single minded focus on
passage of EFCA. Meanwhile people are losing their jobs and getting kicked out
of their homes in record numbers, while others—from the high skilled to the low
skilled, white collar and blue collar—walk a financial tightrope, in high
anxiety, without a net.
And no
matter what one thinks of EFCA or the possibility of its passage in a
meaningful form, it is not an adequate response to the current crisis. In the
most wildly optimistic scenario, any benefits from EFCA—and we think they will
be modest, but important—are a year or two down the road. And while passage
could ratchet up union density a notch or two, it is worth remembering that to
raise union density one percentage point labor must hold on to all its existing
members and organize well over one million additional workers per year—a
formidable task to say the least. Also worth noting is that the two
industries with among the highest union densities—autos and airlines—are both
basket cases where collective bargaining is strictly a give-back game. That’s
because the global forces transforming the industrial landscape, are far beyond
the ability of traditional collective bargaining to influence.
The labor
movement historically has two functions: to represent workers in the workplace
through collective bargaining, and, to be the socially sanctioned
representatives of the general economic interests of workers in public
discourse. It is this second role—as a representative of all workers—that
labor now needs to assume. What is needed at this moment of crisis is a
new spirit in the labor movement and a new kind of unionism that addresses the
needs of all workers and combines the mass mobilizing and protest techniques of
modern social movements with an alternative vision of economic reconstruction
from the bottom up.
The
spirit of the times
The 250
workers at Republic Windows and Doors in Chicago provided a glimpse of what
this kind of unionism might look like, and how it could transform labor. Faced
with the prospect of losing pay and benefits owed them when management
announced that the plant was closing immediately and workers would not be
receiving the severance pay or accrued vacation pay owed them by law, the
workers—and the scrappy, independent, United Electrical Workers Union
(UE) that represents them—took matters into their own hands and refused
to leave the factory. They did not wait to plead their case to politicians or
file law suits, they took direct action.
The sit-in at
Republic Windows lasted 6 days. It was well planned and well executed.
As early as mid-November, when workers noticed machinery being trucked
away—a classic harbinger of a plant closing—the union began planning for an
occupation should it become necessary. When the announcement came they were
ready. “We knew keeping the windows in the warehouse was a bargaining
chip,” said one worker. The occupation was accompanied by a brilliant outside
campaign that targeted not only Republic Windows, but the Bank of America,
which had refused to extend a new line of credit to the company after it
exhausted its old one, forcing it into bankruptcy. Bank of America is a recent
recipient of billions of dollars in bailout money and a perfect target for
public shaming.
A first
class media campaign clearly presented the issues to the public. In a manner
reminiscent of the highly popular UPS strike of 1997 that portrayed that
company’s shift to part time workers as an attack on all workers, the UE called
the Republic occupation “….a win for all working men and women who face
uncertainty, unfairness and job loss in a troubled economy.” Help poured in
from everywhere in the form of demonstrations, on-site support, and material
help for the workers. President-elect Obama, state and local officials, other
unions and social justice movements from around the country all joined in
support.
The press treated the occupation as a major event and the reporting
was generally very good, and on occasion, outstanding. In the end, the
workers won the 60 days severance pay due them, along with accrued vacation
time. They forced Bank of America to
lend the company $1.35 million, and got J.P. Morgan, which owned a stake in the
company, to come up with additional money. The union also began a “Window of Opportunity Fund”
to explore ways to keep the plant open under worker control.
New
realities require new directions
The UAW’s
decades old sectoral alliance with the auto companies has been an abject
failure. While management drove the industry into a ditch, the UAW sat quietly
in the passenger seat. Now, without independence or ideas, the union seems
incapable of mobilizing its members or their communities—mobilize for what?—and
it garners little public sympathy. Instead, the UAW is reduced to
offering more concessions, if only the Administration or Congress will come up
with some cash. It now appears that the bailout package will force the UAW to cut
wages, and match the work rules, of the non-union transplants in the South. The
idea of government mandated wages and work rules pegged to non-union employers
adds a whole new dimension to the race to the bottom.
In
contrast, the UE’s direct action, bottoms up approach at Republic Windows and
the overwhelmingly positive response it received, tapped into the public’s
anger and desire for change and points the way to another avenue for
labor. New strategies and tactics are now on the table. It is no accident
that the occupation came on the heels of Obama’s election victory, widely
perceived as a mandate for change. The spirit, strategy, and participatory
ethos of the strike signal the possibility of a new kind of social movement
unionism that could renew labor.
But there
is another profound lesson in these two events. In the end, despite their
militancy and brilliant tactics, the workers at Republic still lost their jobs.
In the coming months millions of other workers are likely to lose their
jobs. The global economic forces at work are far beyond the capacity of
the biggest or most militant unions to address. That will take thousands of
actions like the one at Republic, not just at the workplace but in all corners
of the economy and society, linked together and clamoring for an alternative to
the failed economy. And it will take a labor movement that is willing to
step into its role as the people’s voice.
TC
Recent Comments